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Article 7

THE CONTOURS
OF LOSS
Naomi Mandel
Lost Bodies: Inhabiting the Borders
of Life and Death by Laura E.
Tanner. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2006. Pp. 264.
$21.00 paper.

In Lost Bodies, Laura Tanner examines the philosophical, epistemological, and conceptual challenges
that personal loss poses to prevailing discourses of grief. Taking as
its focus photographic images, literary and nonliterary texts, and
commemorative objects like the
AIDS Memorial Quilt, Lost Bodies
explores “how cultural constructions
of death and grief are inextricably
bound with specific assumptions
about the body” (4). What, asks
Tanner, can the lost body—the
wasting body of the terminally ill,
the absent body of the deceased—
tell us about our own bodies and
our embodied experience of the
world? Contemporary U.S. culture,
she argues, disavows the absent
body by narrativizing grief as recovery, by aligning bereavement
with survival, or by depicting the
deceased as present in another,
better place. This dynamic of disavowal is informed by a fiction of
disembodiment—a psyche unfettered by materiality and corporeality and a body that is autonomous,
healthy, and invulnerable. Disavowing the absent body precludes
examining how our bodies are
intertwined with the bodies of others and prohibits acknowledging
that loss is a physical phenomenon,
as well as a psychological one.
“Cultural constructions of death
and grief” is a very broad topic, and
Tanner draws on an array of disciplines to approach it. She references
recent work in disability studies
and studies of aging to trouble the
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distinction between the healthy and
the dying; she relies on work in
psychoanalysis and phenomenology
to highlight the role of the body (or
the implications of its absence)
in perception and experience; she
employs the methodologies of cultural studies and of sociology to
expand the scope of her discussion
beyond the literary; and she pays
special attention to photography.
Throughout, Tanner mobilizes her
considerable talents in literary analysis to explore “the way in which
the body of illness or grief is absent
from critical discourse and lost to
cultural view” (2). As this formulation indicates, hers is a conceptually tricky project—demonstrating
the presence of the body’s absence—
and Tanner treats its challenges
as an opportunity for close, careful,
eloquent, and sometimes downright brilliant readings of images,
texts, spaces, and objects. Lost
Bodies alternates between brief
discussions—some only a few pages
long—of novels, short stories, condolence cards, the AIDS Memorial
Quilt, the medical waiting room,
and the HBO series Six Feet
Under (2001–5)—and more extensive engagements with poetry by
Sharon Olds and Mark Doty; novels by Marilynne Robinson, Carolyn Parkhurst, and Don DeLillo;
Roland Barthes’s autobiographical
meditations in Camera Lucida (1980);
and the photography of Billy
Howard, Nicholas Nixon, and
Shellburne Thurber. Throughout,
Tanner argues that the body and

its loss, like embodiment and perception, are fundamentally intertwined. Given that we experience
through our interactions with the
tactile world, the body we can no
longer touch calls into question both
experience and world; focusing on
representations of and approaches
to the lost body throws both prevailing discourses of the body and
the stakes of these discourses into
high relief.
Tanner has an eye for nuance;
her writing is rigorous but accessible, and her analysis illuminates
each text she discusses. In the course
of this book these discussions do
become somewhat repetitive—one
gets the sense that Tanner is enjoining us, again and again, to “see what
is not there” (173). More problematic is the book’s conceptual trajectory, which moves too quickly from
illness to death and from loss to
grief; and its theoretical scaffolding, which relies on Merleau-Ponty
and Freud at the expense of more
recent work and advances, without
explicitly saying so, a quite vehement critique of the image and
of the power dynamics of vision.
Finally, though Tanner describes
Lost Bodies as a critical engagement
with “assumptions about embodiment and mortality in contemporary American culture” (3), she
never explains what is uniquely
American about the assumptions
she explores. Most of the artists
and authors she discusses are U.S.
nationals (an obvious exception
is Roland Barthes, whose Camera

ON TANNER’S LOST BODIES
Lucida is treated as a primary text),
but this fact does not suffice to
anchor references to “[c]ontemporary American culture’s insistence
on isolating and disavowing the
bodily dimensions of illness and
grief ” (3) and fails to explain just
how, or why, “American culture
touts the consolation of memory
and image as an answer to loss”
(89). The lack of such self-reflexivity
becomes sadly clear when Tanner
turns, in the “Postscript,” to the
events of 11 September 2001.
Readers familiar with Tanner’s
previous work (her first book,
Intimate Violence, focused on the
dynamics of reading fictional representations of violence) will recognize in Lost Bodies Tanner’s
privileging of experience over and
above its representation and discursive mediation, and her investment
in an embodied reading practice by
which the reader realizes the extent
to which she is complicit with
the discursive regime that the text
reproduces and enforces, a realization that, in itself, grounds an ethical
response. Intimate Violence aimed
to “subvert the disembodying tendencies of the reading process in
order to . . . remind the reader of
his or her own violability.”1 Lost
Bodies, which expands the reading
process from fiction to images,
objects, and institutional spaces, has
a similar goal: to dissolve the distinction between the ill or absent
body and the self in order to redefine that self as embodied, subject
to fragmentation and mortality.
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This work has clear social, institutional, and ethical stakes. “Critical attention to the construction of
embodied subjectivity in illness
and in grief,” writes Tanner, is “a
form of caring for the vulnerable
body” (10), and invites a kind of
resistance to cultural forces that
render that body invisible: “thinking about the way we know . . . in
and through the body allows us to
resist the pressure of immaterialization that would exclude palpable, multisensory experience not
only from the realm of knowledge
in general but from our understanding of grief in particular” (209).
The formulation of these objectives (critical attention is a form of
caring; thinking allows us to resist)
sits uneasily with Tanner’s commitment to materialism and avowed
pragmatism; given the compelling
nature of this material and the
urgency and passion with which she
approaches it, her reluctance to
move from describing a problem to
proposing a solution is frustrating.
Ultimately, Tanner remains content
to do what she does well: “revealing
the strategies through which we
have attempted to relegate the body
to the position of subject or object—
extension of thought or mere
thing—rather than recognizing the
way its very existence blurs and
complicates those categories” (5).
The arc of the book follows Tanner’s own experience of her father’s
death, moving from a focus on the
critically ill body in part 1 (“The
Dying Body”) to an examination of
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the processes of mourning in part 2
(“The Body of Grief”). This structure is designed to perform the
trajectory of her argument: the
dying subject becomes the object of
mourning’s discourse, and Tanner’s
focus on the dying body in the first
part of the book lays the groundwork for the longer second part,
which is an approach to grief that
is predicated not on the grieving
subject’s survival but on the fact of
the lost body’s absence, “at once the
most obvious fact of grief and at the
same time the most unspeakable”
(84). The structure of the book mirrors its topic: the body’s presence,
its absence, and “the dynamics
of absent presence” (95), through
which Tanner examines the phenomenon of loss. Unlike absence
(with which it is too easily conflated), loss presupposes a specific
object, stressing that object’s presence as absence. Furthermore, given
that the object is perceived by the
body, its absence is experienced
in corporeal terms as well. Rather
than attempting to resolve this paradox (the palpable presence of the
corporeal body’s absence), Tanner
dwells on—or within—it, holding
tenaciously to the material quality
of loss, refusing “the cultural force
that pulls us out of our bodies and
pushes us to reconstitute ourselves
through language, metaphor, and
image as continuously whole,”
and choosing rather to inhabit the
uneasy space between the two (92).
This is a daunting prospect, as
it requires maintaining the tension

between lived experience and its
inevitable appropriation by mediating discourses, but Tanner treats
this challenge as an opportunity
to generate elegant and insightful readings of texts, objects, and
images. Her discussion of Shellburne Thurber’s images of empty
or abandoned spaces, for example,
maintains “the tension between
absence and presence” in order to
show how Thurber’s photographs
“evoke absent bodies that never
existed as presences for the viewer”
(116), and she reads individual panels on the AIDS Memorial Quilt
with an eye to how the objects on
the quilt, present precisely because
of the body’s absence, evoke the
body that wore, used, played with,
or cherished them.
The most effective moments of
Lost Bodies are when Tanner extends
loss’s intertwining of absence and
presence to the imagery and language that dominate prevailing discourses of grief. Reading Marilynne
Robinson’s Housekeeping (1980) with
an eye to the incontrovertible fact
that Ruth cannot touch her dead
mother or be touched by her, for
example, Tanner uncovers the radical implications of being literally
“out of touch”: “the experience of
grief locks [Ruth] away from the
tactile world and questions the presence not only of her mother’s body
and her own but of those around
her” (102). In the case of the AIDS
Memorial Quilt, “the spatial and
material dimensions of objects on
the quilt complicate the process of
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their signification by continually
returning us from the realm of the
symbolic to an understanding of
the way in which things mark and
are marked by an embodied use”
(202). Her brief but compelling discussion of Alice Sebold’s immensely
popular novel The Lovely Bones
(2002) reveals the pernicious quality of “a logic that invokes embodiment only to metaphorize it” (202):
through its reliance on symbols and
images that compensate for physical violation (“the lovely bones” of
the title is a metaphor for the social
connections that form in the wake
of a child’s rape and murder), the
novel evokes and authorizes discourses that, by disavowing both
the body’s experience and the experience of its absence, relocate experience to the immaterial.
Tanner is at her best in such close
readings, dwelling on each nuance
of the text—be it a photograph,
literature, literary theory and philosophy, or her own experiences
of illness and grief—and offering
analyses that are luminous, eloquent, and often exquisite. And yet,
I could not but be troubled by Tanner’s conflation of loss with death
in her treatment of illness, which is
represented exclusively by terminal
cancer and terminal AIDS. Attending only to terminal illness—as if
a diagnosis of cancer or of HIV +
were a death sentence—misses
the myriad ways people live with
illness and its losses outside the
dominating narrative of grief. Representations of the disabled as
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grieving for health is one of the
most consistent targets of critique
in the field of disability studies, and
Lost Bodies, which draws on disability studies in its emphasis on the
corporeal dimensions of experience
and in its challenge to paradigms
of selfhood defined by autonomy
and agency (3), moves too quickly
to assume that illness results in grief
(for health or for life). The book
thus risks perpetuating fundamental cultural assumptions about the
disabled that scholars like Lennard
Davis and Rosemarie GarlandThomson have urgently worked
to undo.
The book’s theoretical parameters lie at the intersection of discourses about the subject and
subjectivity on the one hand and
theories of the body on the other.
Taking her cue from Elizabeth
Grosz’s and Gail Weiss’s work
on corporeality and embodiment,
but primarily referencing MerleauPonty’s revision of Cartesian dualism and his identification of the
body as the subject, not the object,
of perception, Tanner focuses on
“the way that the sensory particularity of our lived existence shapes
and defines our relationships to
one another and our experience of
the world” (8). She usefully extends
the scope of Merleau-Ponty’s investigation by pointing out that, for
Merleau-Ponty, the body in question is a living, healthy, present body.
What, asks Tanner, can we learn
about experience, subjectivity, and
the body when the body is or will
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be absent? If the very self-evidence
of sentience challenges critical discourse about self-evidence and
about sentience, the dead and dying
body catapults sentience, corporeality, materiality, and the body
itself into radical uncertainty.
Against Merleau-Ponty’s paradigm of embodiment, Tanner posits
Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917), which stands for “definitions of mourning which disavow
the embodied dynamics of grief ”
(4). Tanner aligns herself with
Kathleen Woodward and Michael
Moon, who have expressed reservations about Freud’s treatment
of grief as something to be quickly
overcome and disposed of rather
than explored. She situates her own
discussion of Freud as an answer
to Woodward’s call to supplement
Freud’s theory of mourning with
a theory of grief (92–93), pointing
out that the psychic work Freud
describes neglects the embodied
aspects of experience: “At no point
does Freud address the way in
which the subject’s relationship to
the lost object is constituted through
the body as well as through the
psyche” (94, original emphasis).
As Tanner mobilizes her phenomenological approach to lay bare
how grief troubles Freud’s distinction between the lost object’s presence (in memory) and its absence
(in reality), the dynamics of presence and absence emerge as the
conceptual foundation for Tanner’s
underlying distrust of the image:
“If we understand presence as

embodied presence,” writes Tanner,
“. . . Freud’s model is complicated
by memory’s limited ability to capture the multisensory experience
of a lost body” (95, original emphasis). Memory’s ability is limited
because, as Tanner puts it, “memory’s images have no bodies” (95),
and it is this conceptualization
of the image in terms of the body’s
absence that will emerge, in the
course of Lost Bodies, as the book’s
unstated agenda: a critique of the
dynamics of vision and “contemporary image culture” (174), which,
Tanner insists, play a special role in
causing the lost body to “disappear[] from cultural view . . . along
with the sensory traces of its corporeal presence” (2).
By opposing an epistemology of
the body (represented primarily by
Merleau-Ponty’s work in the 1960s)
to psychoanalytic theories that disavow it (represented primarily by
Freud’s 1917 essay), Tanner misses
some important opportunities to
situate her discussion within more
contemporary work. Her emphasis
on the experiential quality of psychic states ignores recent work
on affect by Sara Ahmed, Brian
Massumi, Lauren Berlant, and Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick, each of whom
traces the inextricability of corporeal experience from representational dynamics. Her privileging
of Freud’s work on mourning also
raises the question of the potential
relevance of melancholia to this
study. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud opposes mourning,
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which he associates with the reality
principle, to melancholia, which he
dismisses as a pathology, because
the melancholiac, unlike the mourner, holds tenaciously to the lost
object. Tanner’s attention to “the
grieving subject’s refusal to move
past the fact of the absent body”
(134) seems to evoke Freud’s definition of melancholia. And yet, she
pays no attention to the term or
to work on melancholia by Judith
Butler, Julia Kristeva, and especially
David Eng and David Kazanjian,
whose edited collection Loss: The
Politics of Mourning appropriates
Freud’s concept of melancholia to
focus on “embodied losses” and to
ask “how the productive constraints
of melancholia materialize bodies.”2
If the book’s structure enacts
Tanner’s argument about the body
and its loss, it also reflects her distrust of the power dynamics of
vision, a distrust that extends to the
image as such. Part 1 approaches the
dying body as the object of an empowered, disembodied, “healthy,”
or “medical” gaze that reduces the
patient to the bearer of a disease
(a paradigm that Tanner borrows
from Foucault’s Birth of the Clinic
[1963]). Tanner asks whether looking at a person with terminal illness may complicate these power
dynamics: “Because the object of
the gaze announces not only difference but sameness, the subject’s
recognition of a shared mortality
lends power to the very threat that
the healthy gaze would dispel” (24).
Against the healthy gaze, Tanner
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posits an “embodied gaze” that
eschews omniscience and “dissolves
the subject/object dynamics of the
gaze until the healthy subject is
forced to acknowledge its own mortality” (39). She reads Sharon Olds’s
account of her father’s death from
terminal cancer as the articulation
of such a gaze: a deathwatch in
which, as Tanner poetically puts it,
“the watcher becomes the watched”
(39). In her discussion of medical
waiting rooms, Tanner draws on
her own experience and on representations of medical waiting rooms
in literature and memoir to demonstrate that the panoptic quality
of this liminal space “disrupts the
motion of even the healthy subject’s gaze by turning it back onto
the self” (78), so that “the gaze that
might otherwise maintain the illusion of absolute distance between
the subject and object of the look
reveals itself as originating in a
body” (79). Her discussion of Billy
Howard’s 1989 Epitaphs for the
Living and Nicholas Nixon’s 1991
People with AIDS traces how photography’s representational conventions negotiate an impossible
economy of physical form on the
one hand and embodied subjectivity on the other—this economy is
impossible because the photographs
either reduce the person with AIDS
to a suffering body or disavow the
physical manifestations of the disease. “As long as the gaze sees as
its object a diseased body but not
the diseased person’s experience
of embodiment, the look only
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perpetuates the experience of dislocation,” writes Tanner (60); “photographic representations [of subjects
who suffer from AIDS] must continually invent ways of subverting
visual conventions, not only those
that code the unmarked body as
‘healthy’ but those which would
transcend the embodied dynamics
of subjectivity or reduce the representational subject to an unfamiliar
object” (63).
While part 1 performs an explicit
critique of the subject/object dynamics that underlie these visual conventions, the second half of the book
expands this critique to what Tanner calls, perhaps too hastily, “contemporary image culture” (174).
Referencing Sartre’s definition of
the image as that “which is absent
from perception,” “an unreality,”
and “a mirage” (quoted in Tanner,
89), Tanner locates within the image
“cultural assumptions about grief
that deny the role of the body in
loss” (87). In a powerful reading of
James Agee’s A Death in the Family
(1957), Tanner convincingly demonstrates how the dead body’s object
status demands that it be accessed
only visually; touch (with its connotations of intimacy and care) is
profoundly inappropriate in this
context. The experience of grief,
then, demands that sight replace
touch, rendering the absent body
(physically) inaccessible and the
desire for it (socially) unspeakable.
The subsequent discussion identifies images as the site wherein
the body is granted an illusion of

presence that only underscores its
absence: images “fail, of necessity,
to hold onto the lost body in all
its texture and specificity,” writes
Tanner (116); “understanding grief
as an embodied experience demands
acknowledgement not just of the
failure of . . . images to render the
body present, but of their sustaining contribution to the taunting
rhythms of grief” (89). She reads
Roland Barthes’s Camera Lucida as
an account of the grieving narrator’s “poignant but unsuccessful
attempts to offset the failures of the
visual image” (115); in Marilynne
Robinson’s Housekeeping, “images
gesture toward a lost body that the
image cannot hold and the mourner
cannot touch” (103); Shellburne
Thurber’s photographs of empty
and abandoned domestic spaces testify, again and again, to “the limitations of the image” (116, 127).
Clearly, then, Lost Bodies offers
a resolute, if implicit, critique of
the power dynamics of the gaze
and of the visual image’s illusion of
presence. This critique extends from
the image in particular to representation as such: the image is aligned
with representation against the
body and its experience. “Given the
image’s primarily visual quality,
its failure to hold onto the textured
experience of the lived body exaggerates its already mediated representational status,” writes Tanner
(95); “depictions of grief,” she states
elsewhere, “often become entangled with explorations of the act of
representation” as they confront
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“the failure of both the promise of
representation and the culture of
simulation to speak to the embodied dynamics of loss” (134). This
opposition of the image and representation to the body and its experience testifies to the moral and
ethical stakes of Tanner’s project:
“to rescue the materiality of the
body from those who would situate it entirely within the realms of
discourse” (7). But the efficacy of
such a project is limited, and not
only because Tanner relies on Sartre
at the expense of recent work by
Vivian Sobchack and Brian Massumi, each of whom has treated
vision in corporeal and experiential
terms (Sobchack’s book The Address
of the Eye [1992] employs MerleauPonty’s phenomenology to highlight
the material quality of spectatorship;
Massumi’s Parables for the Virtual
[2002] models an approach to the
body and its sensations that eludes
the structural account of subject
formation that opposes the subject
to discourse) but because, as the book
progresses, what Tanner means
by “image” becomes increasingly
unclear. In her discussion of Barthes’s Camera Lucida and Robinson’s Housekeeping—both of which
“document the failure of the image
to hold onto the specificity of a
missing body” (116)—“image” refers
to a memory, a photograph, and a
literary device, all within the space
of two sentences: Ruth is left with
“with a head full of images,” Barthes
with “a handful of glossy paper,”
and the reader of Camera Lucida
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with the “image of Barthes . . . turning not to embrace another body but
to dance with the beloved image”
(114–15). As Tanner’s discussion
moves to Carolyn Parkhurst’s The
Dogs of Babel (2003), Don DeLillo’s
The Body Artist (2001), and Mark
Doty’s long poem “The Wings”
(1993), “image” comes to mean anything and everything that might
pose a challenge to embodied experience in “an age of images” (227).
Perhaps because the conceptual
blurriness of “image” causes Lost
Bodies to lose focus, I was especially
disappointed by Tanner’s engagement, in the “Postscript,” with the
events of 11 September 2001, which
she reads as an attack on “America’s image culture” (223). Tanner’s
main objective here is to explore
“how we, as a culture, name and
understand a loss the ‘lived experience’ of which most of us can claim
but cannot embody” (226). Given
Lost Bodies’ self-proclaimed U.S.
context, her approach to 9/11 seems
to be motivated by a mandate to
extend the claims of the body’s experience to (but not beyond) the body
politic. She focuses on attempts, by
Americans, to create proximity or
intimacy with the dead, and concludes by suggesting that “our experience of September 11 . . . creates
the possibility of experiencing as
absence something we as a culture
naturalize as presence: the force
of embodiment and, consequently,
the power of its loss” (236).
The “Postscript” is prefaced with
a statement to the effect that a book

672

NAOMI MANDEL

entitled Lost Bodies must perforce
address 9/11 (222). This may be so,
but this fact alone does not justify
so sudden an extension of “the force
of embodiment” from person to
culture, nor does it justify limiting
“culture” to U.S. culture. A more
effective approach might have referenced related meditations on how
loss navigates the relation of the
body to the body politic. Judith
Butler’s Precarious Life suggests
that “each of us is constituted politically in part by virtue of the social
vulnerability of our bodies . . . Loss
and vulnerability,” writes Butler,
in a move that Tanner might have
found useful, “seem to follow from
our being socially constituted bodies, attached to others, at risk of
exposing those attachments, exposed
to others, at risk of violence by virtue of that exposure.”3 In her quest
for “a language that addresses the
significance of September 11 without abstracting the materiality and
specificity of overwhelming loss”
(222), Tanner might also have had
recourse to Ahmed, whose Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004)
explores the interpenetration of
individual bodies and social bodies, especially in the aftermath of
9/11, or Eng and Kazanjian, whose
collection examines “not only how
bodies see and hear losses but also
how specific sociohistorical losses
see and hear bodies.”4 Neither
Ahmed nor Eng and Kazanjian
limit their purview to the United
States.

Alternately, Tanner might have
used these concluding pages to revise
and expand her narrow definition
of loss as the loss of a body, and the
body as the body of a beloved. Lost
Bodies is about a very specific kind
of loss: “the kind of loss that tears a
loved one away from a parent, child,
or lover” (101); its scope is limited
to what happens in the wake of “the
unfolding of two bodies once intertwined” (88). But need “a corporeal
theory of grief,” one that would
“acknowledge and respond to the
way the loss of . . . feeling shapes
the feeling of loss” (84), be confined
solely to the loss of “a living,
breathing child, husband, mother,
or friend” (104)? After all, in
“Mourning and Melancholia” Freud
defines mourning as “the reaction
to the loss of a loved person, or
to the loss of some abstraction which
has taken the place of one [emphasis
mine], such as one’s country, liberty,
an ideal, and so on.”5 I’m sympathetic to Tanner’s distrust of abstraction in the face of personal loss, but
the loss of a home to flooding, the
loss of a homeland to war, loss of
language to exile, loss of faith, loss
of solvency, loss of health, loss of
hope—each is manifested in and
through the chiasmic intertwining
of body and world that MerleauPonty delineates and on which
Tanner’s project of “theorizing
embodiment through the category
of the experiential” (222) relies.
—University of Rhode Island
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